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NOTE
EVIDENCE-NORTH CAROLINA ALLOWS ADMISSION OF
THE UNTHINKABLE: HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS AND
STATEMENTS MADE BY SEXUALLY ABUSED CHIL-
DREN-State v. Smith
INTRODUCTION
The American public has slowly faced the grim fact that the
nightmare of sexual child abuse is a reality.1 The problem has ex-
isted throughout history2 but now, more than ever, cases of sexual
child abuse are being reported. This dramatic increase in the
1. Mass child sexual abuse cases in California, Minnesota, and a number of
other states have been highly publicized. Such cases provoke and illustrate the
raised consciousness of Americans with the issue of sexual exploitation of chil-
dren. Reese, A Child-Abuse Case Implodes, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 27, 1986 at 26; La-
mar, Disturbing End of a Nightmare, Timi, Feb. 25, 1985, at 22; and Hager, King,
Namuth, Sherman & Walters, The Youngest Witnesses, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 18,
1985, at 72.
2. Prior to 1962, reports of child abuse were nonexistent, at least in the medi-
cal literature. Before that time nothing appeared in the areas of medical or scien-
tific knowledge that would lead one to believe that it was possible for such a large
group of adults to abuse children. In 1946, a radiologist named John Caffey pro-
duced a study for the American Journal of Roentgenology that suggested that
abnormal bone fractures in children might be the result of intentional physical
abuse. This suggestion so alarmed the editors of the journal that Caffey's final
article, "Multiple Fractures in Long Bones of Infants Suffering from Chronic Sub-
dural Hematoma," did not contain references to intentional abuse. Caffey, Multi-
ple Fractures in Long Bones of Infants Suffering from Chronic Subdural Hema-
toma, 56 AM. J. ROENTOENOLOGY 163 (1946).
In 1962 Dr. C. Henry Kempe stunned the medical world with his article,
"The Battered Child Syndrome." Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemulle & Sil-
ver, The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962). This article marked
the beginning of the acceptance by physicians that the phenomenon of child
abuse did exist. Approximately fifteen years later the medical profession and so-
cial workers discovered that the same dynamics that produced the battered child
syndrome also produced sexually abused child syndrome.
. 3. See State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 697 P.2d 836 (1985). "[T]he incidence of
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number of cases reported has important implications for our legal
system as the law tries to effectively deal with those responsible for
the abuse.4 However, conviction of offenders is extremely difficult.
Some of the difficulty involved is inherent in the crime itself.'
Many times both physical6 and testimonial evidence 7 of a sexual
sexual abuse of young children has increased dramatically in recent years ...
Statistics show that there has been a 200% increase in the reporting of sexual
abuse since 1976. By 1980, there were 25,000 reported cases annually. A substan-
tial number of cases are never reported; estimates of the actual incidence vary
from 100,000 to 500,000 per year." Id. at 27, 697 P.2d at 841, (quoting Yun, A
Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1745 n.1 (1983)). Although it is estimated that approximately
400,000 children are sexually abused annually, only about 29% of these crimes are
ever reported. NAT'L CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: INCEST ASSAULT AND SEXUAL Ex-
PLOITATION, (1981).
Unfortunately, North Carolina is not immune to this trend. Since statistics
have been compiled, the number of child sexual abuse cases reported has contin-
ued to rise steadily. For the fiscal year 1983-84, 673 substantiated cases of sexual
child abuse were reported. For 1984-85, 962 were reported and for 1985-86, 1036
cases were reported. These figures reflect cases were investigations by social ser-
vice departments revealed evidence that confirmed child sexual abuse by a parent
or caretaker (caretakers included daycare workers). These statistics do not ac-
count for the number of children sexually abused by strangers. (Information ob-
tained from Central Registry, Child Protective Services, N.C. Division of Social
Services, Department of Human Resources, Raleigh, North Carolina.) Child Pro-
tective Services estimates that for every case of sexually abuse reported, three
cases are not. (Information obtained from Child Protective Services).
4. The benefits of criminal prosecution in sexual abuse cases include "pro-
tecting society, serving as a symbol to society and the child of the total unac-
ceptability of the behavior, and providing an authoritative incentive or leverage to
insure treatment of the offender and family." KOCEN & BULKLEY, Analysis of
Criminal Child Sex Offense Statutes in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW 1 (J.
Bulkley 2d ed. 1982) (citing K. MACFARLANE, Foreward, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE:
LEGAL ISSUES AND APPROACHES i-ii, (National Legal Resources Center for Child
Advocacy and Protection, American Bar Association, Sept. 1980)).
5. Most sexual abuse crimes are nonviolent in nature, See FLAMMANG, Inter-
viewing Child Victims of Sex Offenders, in THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH
175, 177 (L. Schultz ed. 1980); MACFARLANE, Sexual Abuse of Children, in THE
VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN 81, 87 (1978), and occur within the home, in secrecy,
between a minor child and a trusted family member or acquaintance of the child.
See STEVENS & BERLINER, Special Techniques for Child Witnesses, in THE SEX-
UAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 246, (L. Schultz ed. 1980). These facts make the de-
tection of sex abuse, as well as the conviction of sex abuse, difficult. The above
articles are cited in Yun, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay State-
ments in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745 nn.2-3 (1983).
6. Because the crimes committed are predominately nonviolent in nature,
2
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abuse incident is unavailable. Usually, no one but the offender and
the child witness the crime. The victim may retract his or her story
before or during trial8 or be found incompetent to testify.' Even if
the child is allowed to testify that child's credibility may be ques-
tionable.10 Hearsay 1 evidence is often the best evidence the state
there is often no physical evidence of abuse. Children usually will not resist be-
cause they do not realize the act is wrong or they may be threatened physically if
they do resist. Most sex crimes involving children consist of petting, exhibition-
ism, fondling, and oral copulation-all activities not involving forceful physical
contact. Physicians may be unable to provide any clear medical evidence as to
whether the child was sexually molested. See Yun, supra note 5, at 1750.
7. Plaine, Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions, 63
GEO. L.J. 257, 259 (1974).
8. Because of the guilt of the assailant, the ambivalence towards him or her,
and the disruption to the family that a child victim's disclosure of sexual abuse
evokes, "whatever a child says about sexual abuse, she is likely to reverse it."
Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 177, 188 (1983). See also Love v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 432, 441, 219 N.W. 2d
294, 299 (1974) and State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983).
9. Competency to testify is evaluated by most courts on a case by case basis.
For reviews of supporting case law, see Siegel & Hurley, The Role of the Child's
Preference in Custody Proceedings, 11 FAM. L.Q. 1, 42-57 (1977) and Stofford,
The Child as a Witness, 37 WASH. L. REV. 303 (1962). The essential considera-
tions in the determination are the child's veracity, intelligence, memory, and ver-
bal capacity. Age is also a factor, but not necessarily determinative. MELTON, BUL-
KLEY, WULHAN, Competency of Children as Witnesses, in CHILD SExuAL ABUSE
AND THE LAW 125 (J. Bulkley 2d ed. 1982).
In North Carolina,
[t]here is no age below which one is incompetent, as a matter of law, to
testify. The test of competency is the capacity of the proposed witness to
understand and to relate under the obligation of an oath facts which will
assist the jury in determining the truth of the matters as to which it is
called upon to decide. This is a matter which rests in the sound discre-
tion of the trial judge in the light of his examination and observation of
the particular witness.
State v. Jones, 310 N.C. 716, 722, 314 S.E.2d 529, 533 (1984) (quoting State v.
Turner, 268 N.C. 225, 230, 150 S.E.2d 406, 410 (1966)). See also State v. Fearing,
315 N.C. 167, 337 S.E.2d 551 (1985) where the North Carolina Supreme Court
found that the trial court erred in adopting a stipulation that a four-and-one-half-
year-old victim was incompetent to testify without the court personally examining
the child or observing the child being examined by counsel on voir dire.
10. Despite the child's tendency to be truthful, testimony of a child at trial
often yields "poor and unconvincing evidence." Yun, supra note 5, at 1751. Stud-
ies show that the stress of testifying in a sex abuse case adversely affects the child
victim's perception and memory. Id. This is especially true if the victim must face
the accused in court.
The child's testimony may also be adversely affected by the long lapse of
19871
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has to convict a person guilty of sexually exploiting children. 2 And
yet, the hearsay evidence needed to prosecute the offender is often
not within a hearsay exception and is excluded at trial.'3 In State
v. Smith, 4 the North Carolina Supreme Court faced the issue of
deciding how North Carolina would treat hearsay statements made
by sexually abused children under the new North Carolina Rules
of Evidence.' 5
In balancing the court's responsibility to protect children from
sexual abuse and the constitutional right of a defendant to con-
front witnesses,"6 the court gave liberal interpretation to two hear-
say exceptions and provided a detailed interpretation of a third..
time between the crime and the trial. A child's memory of details blurs quickly.
STEVEN & BERLINER, supra note 5, at 254.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 801(c) (1986) defines hearsay as "a state-
ment, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hear-
ing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
12. Because of the serious problems associated with courtroom testimony of
the child victim in a sex abuse case, the out-of-court statements of the victim
often become crucial to establishing the guilt of the defendant. Furthermore,
when a child witness is found incompetent to testify, hearsay testimony becomes
extremely important. See, e.g., State v. Gregory, 78 N.C. App. 565, 338 S.E.2d 110
(1985), disc. review denied, 316 N.C. 382, 342 S.E.2d 901 (1986) where a physi-
cian's testimony, including hearsay statements made by the three-and-a-half-
year-old victim as to the identity of the perpetrator, was admissible. The grand-
mother's testimony as to certain statements by the victim was also admissible.
The victim was found incompetent to testify.
13. "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by statute or by these
rules." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 802 (1986).
14. 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 833 (1985).
15. On July 1, 1984, the North Carolina Rules of Evidence Chapter 8C of the
North Carolina General Statutes went into effect. The North Carolina Rules were
modeled after the Federal Rules and are similar in most respects.
16. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution give every person charged with a
crime the right to confront witnesses against him. Although reference will be
made to a criminal defendant's right of confrontation, this Note does not focus on
that right. For a discussion of a defendant's confrontation rights see Comment,
California Evidence Code 1228: A Constitutional Analysis, 17 PAC. L.J. 917
(1986); Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging
Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 19 (1985);
Mlyniec & Dally, See No Evil? Can Insulation of Child Sexual Abuse Victims Be
Accomplished Without Endangering the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 40
U. MIAMI L. REv. 115 (1985); and Frank, Confronting Child Victims of Sex Abuse:
The Unconstitutionality of the Sexual Abuse Hearsay Exception, 7 U. PUGEr
SOUND L. REV. 387 (1984).
440 [Vol. 9:437
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The court found that Rule 803(2),' the excited utterance excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, covers statements made by child victims
of sexual exploitation even though the utterance came several days
after the actual sexual assault occurred.'8 The court also found
that hearsay exception Rule 803(4),'9 statements for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment, covers statements made by child
victims to persons who are not medical personnel, so long as the
statements are for the purpose of obtaining treatment.20 Under
Rule 803(24), the catchall exception, the court found that hearsay
was not admissible unless certain requirements were met.2 2 The
court went on to provide trial judges with a framework of the Rule
803(24)'s requirements. 23 The holdings and logic of Smith will aid
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803(2) states that, "The following are not
excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
. . . Excited Utterance.-A statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event
or condition."
18. 315 N.C. at 90, 337 S.E.2d at 843.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803(4) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness: ... Statements for Purposes of Medi-
cal Diagnosis or Treatment.- Statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of
the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to
diagnosis or treatment.
20. 315 N.C. at 85, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
21. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803(24) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the de-
clarant is available as a witness: . . . Other Exceptions.-A statement
not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court de-
termines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through rea-
sonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the inter-
ests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evi-
dence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception
unless the proponent of it gives written notice stating his intention to
offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and ad-
dress of the declarant, to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of of-
fering the statement to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity
to prepare to meet the statement.
22. 315 N.C. at 91-92, 337 S.E.2d at 844.
23. The court's analysis followed the statutory language of Rule 803(24). The
requirements listed included: (1) proper notice must be given; (2) the hearsay is
1987]
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in convicting those guilty of child molestation by expanding the
medical diagnosis and excited utterance exceptions and providing
guidance for when the Rule 803(24) catchall exception applies.
This Note will discuss how the court's decision to expand the
traditional hearsay exceptions under Rule 803 ranks in effective-
ness with other methods24 which allow into evidence hearsay state-
not specifically covered by another exception; (3) the statement must be trustwor-
thy; (4) the statement must be material; (5) the statement must be more proba-
tive on the issue than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (6) the interests of justice will be best served by
admission of the statement. 315 N.C. at 92-99, 337 S.E.2d at 844-48.
24. Other methods used to admit a child's out-of-court statements of sexual
abuse include: (1) creating a new hearsay exception, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.44.120 (Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (Supp. 1986); and (2) use of
videotaped interviews and depositions which insulate the child victim from the
trauma of open courtroom testimony. This approach, to a varying degree, has
been adopted in a few states. Generally, however, state deposition procedures pre-
serve the defendant's full right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-15-401 (1985); N.M. CHILDREN'S CT. R. 10-217 (1986) (implementing
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1984)).
The following states have special child hearsay exceptions: Alaska: ALASKA
STAT. § 12.40.110 (Supp. 1986); Arizona: ARMZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1986);
Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 Rule 803(25)(A) (1985); Colorado: COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-3-411(3) (1986); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1986);
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37 § 704-6(4)(c) (Smith-Hurd 1986); Indiana: IND.
CODE § 35-37-4-6 (Supp. 1986); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.96(6) (1985) (juvenile
court only); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1983); Minnesota: MINN. STAT.
§ 595.02(3) (1987); Missouri: Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.075 (Vernon 1986-1987); Ne-
vada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.385 (1985); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-69
(1986) (custody or parental termination cases only); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 19-16-38 (1986); Texas: TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.072 (Vernon
1987); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.031 (Vernon 1987); Vermont: VT. R. EVID. 804a
(Supp. 1985); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1987).
The following states have legislation on videotaped testimony of children:
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43.2035 to
43.2037 (Supp. 1985); California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West 1987); Colorado:
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1986); Connecticut: 1985 Conn. Acts 85-587 Jan.
Sess; Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1986); Florida: FLA. STAT. § 92.53
(West Supp. 1986); Indiana: IND. CODE § 35-37-4-8 (Supp. 1986); Kentucky: Ky.
REV. STAT. § 421.350 (Supp. 1986); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205
(1986); Missouri: Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.680 (Vernon 1986-1987); Montana: MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 (1985); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.227 (1985); New
Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517.13-a (Supp. 1986); New Mexico: N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1984); New York: N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.32 (McKin-
ney 1987); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West 1987); Rhode Island:
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.1 (1986) (grand jury proceedings only) and R.I. GEN.
[Vol. 9:437
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ments of a child victim. While Smith does not provide admission
of all critical hearsay statements made by sexually abused chil-
dren,25 the decision goes a long way in allowing North Carolina
courts to admit the unthinkable.
THE CASE
The defendant, Sylvester Smith, Sr., was indicted in six sepa-
rate indictments alleging first degree rape, first degree sexual of-
fense and indecent liberties with two minors, Gloria Ogundeji, age
four, and Janell Smith, age five.26 At trial, the state's evidence
showed that one night during the weekend of March 2, 1984, the
defendant entered the bedroom where Gloria and Janell were
sleeping and engaged in sexual relations with both children.2 7 Glo-
ria 28 testified that Sylvester came into the bedroom, slipped her
pants down, took his clothes off and touched her in her "project"
with his "worm. '29 Gloria denied at trial that the defendant
touched her anywhere else.30 When asked where the "worm" was
she pointed to her vaginal area; and when asked to point to her
"project," she also pointed to her vaginal area. Gloria also identi-
fied the "worm" and "project" on anatomically correct dolls. 31
Janell testified that one night Sylvester told her that he was
going to beat her "half to death" and that he then pushed her
LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (1986); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9
(1986); Texas: TEx. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (Vernon 1987); Utah: UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Supp. 1986); Vermont: VT. R. EvID. 807 (Supp. 1985); and
Wisconsin: WiS. STAT. § 967.04(7) (1986).
25. 315 N.C. at 98, 337 S.E.2d at 848.
26. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 2, State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 337
S.E.2d 833 (1985). Gloria was the daughter of Ann Ogundeji, with whom the de-
fendant had been living, Janell was Gloria's cousin, the daughter of Ann's sister,
Catherine. Janell was staying with Ann, Gloria, Sylvester Sr. and Sylvester Smith,
Jr., in a mobile home. State v. Smith, 315 N.C. at 79, 337 S.E.2d at 837.
27. 315 N.C. at 79, 337 S.E.2d at 836-37.
28. At trial each victim was sequestered during the other's testimony. Id. at
80, 337 S.E.2d at 837.
29. Id. at 79, 337 S.E.2d at 837.
30. Id. at 79-80, 337 S.E.2d at 837. Gloria had told her grandmother, Mrs.
Fannie Mae Davis, that the defendant, Sylvester Smith, had put his hand in her
anal area. Id. at 81, 337 S.E.2d at 837. Gloria had also told a Rape Task Force
volunteer that Sylvester had "put his finger in her 'butt.'" Id. at 80, 337 S.E.2d at
837.
31. Id. at 80, 337 S.E.2d at 837.
19871
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down on the bed and stuck his "thing in my project. '32 When
asked to point out her "project," Janell pointed to her vaginal
area. She further testified that after he did this he "stick [sic] his
hand in my 'butt.'" She pointed to the anal area when asked to
show where her "butt" was located.33
The state also offered testimony of two Rape Task Force vol-
unteers, Ms. Minerva Glidden and Ms. Elena Peterson. Ms. Glid-
den had worked with Gloria and Ms. Peterson with Janell. Ms.
Glidden, a registered nurse,34 and Rape Task Force volunteer, first
met Gloria on March 5, 1984 in the emergency room of the New
Hanover Memorial Hospital. Over the defendant's request for a
limiting instruction on corroboration,35 Ms. Glidden was allowed to
testify that in her conversations with Gloria, Gloria told her that
Sylvester put his finger in her "project," pointing to her vaginal
area, and that he had also put his "finger in her butt," indicating
her anus. She also told Ms. Glidden that Sylvester had gotten on
top of her and put his "peeter-weeter in her project," and indi-
cated that a "peeter-weeter" was a penis.36 Ms. Peterson testified
that she had first met and spoken with Janell on March 7, 1984,
two days after Janell's initial admission to the hospital. Over the
defendant's general objection, Ms. Peterson was allowed to testify
that Janell told her that Sylvester "put his thing in her project"
and "stuck his finger in her butt," and that if she told anybody he
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Ms. Glidden was not acting in her capacity as a registered nurse when she
interviewed Gloria. She was acting merely as a Rape Task Force volunteer.
35. Corroboration is the opposite of impeachment. It is "the process of per-
suading the trier of the facts that a witness is credible." In most jurisdictions
evidence in support of a witness's credibility will not be allowed into evidence
unless the witness has been directly impeached. However, in North Carolina "the
necessity of impeachment as a prerequisite to corroboration is more theoretical
than real," in fact, "many cases ignore the requirement of impeachment alto-
gether." 1 H. BRANDIs, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§ 49-50 (2d rev.
ed. 1982 & 1986 Supp).
The term "corroboration" is also used in situations in which evidence is not
admitted solely for its bearing on credibility.. . . When a witness testifies directly
to a certain fact, circumstantial evidence tending to prove the same fact is often
said to be in 'corroboration' of the witness, particularly when the circumstantial
evidence, standing alone, would not be sufficient to justify a finding of the fact. At
times, when two witnesses testify directly to the same fact, the testimony of the
second is said to 'corroborate' that of the first. Id. at § 49.
36. 315 N.C. at 80, 337 S.E.2d at 837.
[Vol. 9:437
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would "beat her half to death.""7
The state also offered the testimony of Mrs. Fannie Mae Da-
vis, grandmother of Gloria and Janell. Mrs. Davis testified that on
March 3, 1984,38 she stopped by her daughter's home, that Gloria
led her into the bedroom and told her "what Sylvester done [sic]
to me." Gloria related to her grandmother that Sylvester had
pressed his "peeter" in her "project" and put his finger in her
"butt." 9 Mrs. Davis also testified that Gloria told her that Sylves-
ter had "threatened her if she tell it, [sic] he would beat her half to
death. ' 40 Gloria also said Sylvester told her to go in the bathroom
and wash the blood off herself.4' Mrs. Davis told her daughter,
Ann, what Gloria had said about Sylvester and told Ann to take
the child to the hospital. Ann testified that she and Gloria hitch-
hiked in the rain to the hospital.4 Mrs. Davis and her husband
met Janell when she returned home from school that afternoon.
Janell told Mrs. Davis that Sylvester had done the same things to
her and threatened to "beat her half to death" if she told anyone.43
Janell's mother, Catherine, then took Janell to the hospital.4 Both
girls were examined at the hospital on March 5, 1984. Physical evi-
dence revealed trauma to both of the children's vaginal areas.45
The defendant, Sylvester Smith, took the stand and denied ever
sexually molesting either girl in any way.4"
37. Id.
38. All other evidence indicated that Mrs. Davis' visit referred to here was
actually on March 5, 1984, a Monday. Apparently the grandmother confused the
dates.
39. 315 N.C. at 81, 337 S.E.2d at 837.
40. Brief for the Defendant-Appellant at 3, State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 337
S.E.2d 833 (1985).
41. 315 N.C. at 80-81, 337 S.E.2d at 837.
42. Id. at 81, 337 S.E.2d at 837.
43. Brief for the Defendant-Appellant at 3.
44. 315 N.C. at 81, 337 S.E.2d at 837.
45. The examining physician testified at trial as to his observation and exam-
ination of the children. The doctor gave his opinion that the bruising around Glo-
ria's vaginal opening was caused by a male penis and that Janell's injuries 'could
have been caused by a finger or a penis. 315 N.C. at 81, 337 S.E.2d at 838.
46. The defense presented testimony from the defendant that on the night of
March 2, 1984, he and Ann had an argument, and she slept with the children and
he slept on the couch. The defendant testified that on March 3, 1984, the girls
slept in their bedroom and he and Ann slept together. The defendant further
testified that on March 4, 1984, his brother spent the night with them in the
mobile home, and that his brother slept in the girl's bedroom, that the girls slept
in the living room, and that he and Ann slept together in their bedroom. Ann
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The jury returned verdicts of guilty of first degree rape, first
degree sexual offense, and indecent liberties as to Gloria Ogundeji
and verdicts of guilty of first degree sexual offense and taking in-
decent liberties as to Janell Smith. The trial court allowed the de-
fendant's motions to arrest judgment in the convictions of indecent
liberties as to both children. The court sentenced the defendant to
two mandatory life sentences to run concurrently for his convic-
tions of first degree rape and first degree sexual offense of Gloria
Ogundeji. Further, the court imposed a mandatory life sentence for
the conviction of first degree sexual offense as to Janell Smith.
This sentence was to run consecutively with the other life sen-
tence.47 From those judgments the defendant appealed to the
North Carolina Supreme Court, contending that the trial court
erred in allowing Minerva Glidden, Elena Peterson and Fannie
Mae Davis to testify as to certain statements made to them by the
child victims. The defendant argued that the statements were
inadmissible hearsay and were improperly admitted as substantive
evidence.48
The North Carolina Supreme Court found no error as to the
convictions of first degree rape of Gloria Ogundeji and first degree
sexual offense of Janell Smith, but found that the defendant was
entitled to a new trial on the charge of first degree sexual offense
as to Gloria Ogundeji.' 9 The court held that the testimony of Mrs.
Davis clearly came within the Rule 803(4) hearsay exception, state-
ments for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment."0 The court
reasoned that Mrs. Davis' conversation with the children had re-
sulted in medical attention for both girls. However, the court
found that the testimony given by Ms. Glidden and Ms. Peterson
did not fit this exception because the children's statements were
made to persons acting in the capacity of Rape Task Force volun-
teers at a time after the victims had already reached the hospital
and received medical treatment.51 The court also found that Mrs.
Davis' testimony concerning what the children told her was admis-
Ogundeji testified for the defense but rebutted defendant's testimony. Ann fur-
ther testified that defendant had threatened both her and Gloria's life if they
testified against him at trial. Brief for the Defendant-Appellant at 4.
47. Id. at 2.
48. Id. at 7-24.
49. 315 N.C. at 102, 337 S.E.2d at 850.
50. Id. at 83-4, 337 S.E.2d at 839.
51. Id. at 86, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
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sible under the Rule 803(2) excited utterance exception.52 The
state did not argue that the statements made to Ms. Glidden and
Ms. Peterson were admissible under the excited utterance excep-
tion.53 The court's final consideration was the state's contention
that the testimony of Ms. Glidden and Ms. Peterson was admissi-
ble under the Rule 803(24) residual or catchall exception. The
court found the statements improperly admitted.5 4 The record did
not indicate whether the trial judge analyzed the appropriateness
of admitting the testimony in light of the specific requirements set
out in Rule 803(24).55
BACKGROUND
In an attempt to simplify the use and interpretation of the law
of evidence in North Carolina, the General Assembly adopted the
new North Carolina Rules of Evidence in 1984.56 Adoption of the
Rules was prompted by the concern that North Carolina evidence
law had become unwieldy.5 7 Developing over the years through a
number of narrow statutes, a large volume of case law and several
conflicting judicial decisions, North Carolina evidence law was con-
fusing and difficult to master." The new Rules were to bring order
52. Id. at 90, 337 S.E.2d at 843.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 98, 337 S.E.2d at 848.
55. Id. at 91, 337 S.E.2d at 843.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 (1986). The move towards adoption of an evidence
code began in 1979 when a committee, co-chaired by Senator Henson P. Barnes
and Representative Ralph M. Stockton, Jr., was appointed to study the issue. One
year later the Evidence Law Study committee undertook the job of producing a
proposed evidence code. On January 12, 1982, the committee submitted an evi-
dence code, very similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence, to the North Carolina
General Assembly. The General Assembly enacted a revised version of the propo-
sal on July 7, 1983, and North Carolina joined the majority of States with their
own rules of evidence. Crumpler & Widenhouse, An Analysis of the New North
Carolina Evidence Code: Opportunity for Reform, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 n.2
(1984).
57. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, EVIDENCE
LAWS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT TO 1983 GENERAL ASSEMBLY (Jan. 12, 1982) at
888. Broderick, Why North Carolina Should Adopt the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 1 CAMPBELL L. OBSERVER, Jan. 25, 1980, at 3. See sources at infra note 58.
58. Blakey, Moving Towards an Evidence Law of General Principles: Sev-
eral Suggestions Concerning an Evidence Code for North Carolina, 13 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 1 (1981) and Patrick, Toward a Codification of the Law of Evidence in
North Carolina, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 669 (1980).
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to this chaos.5'
The North Carolina Rules of Evidence establish six rules to
govern the admissibility of hearsay. Rule 801 defines hearsay,60
statement,"' and declarant," and specifies that an admission of a
party-opponent is an exception to the hearsay rule.63 Rule 802
states the hearsay rule: "Hearsay is not admissible except as pro-
vided by statute or by these rules. ' " Rule 803 lists exceptions to
the hearsay rule regardless of the availability of the declarant.65
Rule 804 lists hearsay exceptions that only apply if the declarant is
unavailable." Rule 805 allows the admission of hearsay within
hearsay if each part of the combined hearsay statements conforms
59. The drafters of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence chose to model the
Rules after the federal counterparts because the Federal Rules are familiar to
practitioners in North Carolina, the Federal Rules contained generally accepted
rules and are typically the basis of instruction in law school evidence classes, and
because the Federal Rules have proven thorough and manageable. Committee Re-
port, supra note 57, at iv. The North Carolina Rules did not, however, bring great
substantive change to the law of evidence. 1 H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAR-
OLINA EVIDENCE § 2, at 2 n.6 (Supp. 1986).
60. See supra note 11.
61. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 801(a), "statement" is defined as "(1)
an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended
by him as an assertion."
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 801(b) defines a declarant as "a person who
makes a statement."
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803(d) specifies that:
A statement is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if it is of-
fered against a party and it is (A) his own statement, in either his indi-
vidual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has
manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a
person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or
(D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the
scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the
relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of such party during
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
64. This rule is in accord with North Carolina practice prior to adoption of
the rules. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 802 commentary (1986).
65. North Carolina Rule 803 actually only lists twenty-three exceptions to
the hearsay rule. Federal Rule of Evidence 803 lists twenty-four exceptions to the
hearsay rule. North Carolina did not adopt the exception in FED. R. EvID. 803(22)
(judgment of previous conviction). This exception is reserved for future codifica-
tion. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 802(22) (1986).
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 804, provides a definition of unavailability
and then lists five hearsay exceptions where the declarant is required to be
unavailable.
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with an exception to the hearsay rules.67 Rule 806 allows the credi-
bility of the declarant to be attacked or supported by any evidence
that would be admissible had the declarant been present and testi-
fied as a witness at trial."'
Rule 803 contains twenty-three hearsay exceptions where the
availability of the declarant is immaterial. Rule 803 is basically
identical to its federal counterpart.69 The underlying theory for al-
lowing these exceptions to the hearsay rule is that the exceptions
possess "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to
justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial even
though he may be available.""0 Three exceptions listed in Rule 803
are the excited utterance, statements for purposes of medical diag-
nosis or treatment, and the catchall exception."
Rule 803(2), the excited utterance exception, was recognized
by North Carolina common law. 2 The basis for the exception is
that the spontaneity of a statement decreases the likelihood of
fabrication. 73 Rule 803(2) specifies that in order to be an "excited
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 805 is consistent with North Carolina prac-
tice prior to the enactment of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. See, e.g.,
State v. Connley, 295 N.C. 327, 245 S.E.2d 663 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1
Rule 805 commentary (1986).
68. The philosophy behind allowing the impeachment or support of the de-
clarant of a hearsay statement is based on the idea that the declarant is in effect a
witness and that in fairness should be subject to impeachment and support as
though he had in fact testified. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 806 commentary
(1986).
69. See supra note 65.
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803 commentary (1986).
71. Discussion in this Note will be limited to these three hearsay exceptions
in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803 because they were the only three hearsay
exceptions addressed in Smith.
72. 1 H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 164 (2d rev. ed.
1982 & Supp. 1986). While North Carolina common law recognized an exception
for an excited utterance it did not recognize an exception for present sense
impressions.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803 commentary (1986). ("circumstances
may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of
reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication"). Although la-
beled "spontaneous utterance" in North Carolina case law, the Rule 803(2) excep-
tion is substantially the same as the common law exception. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-
1 Rule 803(2). However, the common law exception appears not to be limited
solely to excited utterances. See, e.g., State v. Spivey, 151 N.C. 676, 680-81, 65
S.E. 995, 996-97 (1909) (statements of bystanders must be "strictly contempora-
neous to be admissible"); see also 1 H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE § 164 (2d rev. ed. 1982 & Supp. 1986).
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utterance" a statement must relate to the startling event or condi-
tion and must have been made while the declarant was under the
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. 4 As the
comment to the rule points out, the standard of measurement for
when an excited utterance can be made is the duration of the state
of excitement. 75 No fixed time periods exist by which to measure
the duration of excitement-rather, the character of the transac-
tion or event will largely determine the significance of the time
lapse. 70 However, "[t]he modern trend is to consider whether the
delay in making the statement provided an opportunity to manu-
facture or fabricate the statement.
77
Many jurisdictions have addressed the admissibility of hearsay
statements made by young sexually abused children under the
Rule 803(2) excited utterance exception. In Wisconsin, for exam-
ple, the appellate courts have developed a special species of the
excited utterance exception which allows into evidence statements
made by sexually abused children. 8 In State v. Padilla,79 the Wis-
consin Court of Appeals allowed the victim's mother to testify
about statements the child victim made to her three days after a
sexual assault. The court noted that the stress and spontaneity
upon which the excited utterance exception is based is often pre-
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803(2) (1986).
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803 commentary.
76. Id.
77. Bulkley, Evidentiary Theories for Admitting a Child's Out-of-Court
Statement of Sexual Abuse at Trial, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW 153,
155 (J. Bulkley 2d ed.).
78. State v. Padilla, 110 Wis.2d 414, 329 N.W.2d 263 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
See, e.g., State v. Gollon, 115 Wis.2d 592, 340 N.W.2d 912 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983)
(mother and neighbor allowed to testify to statements of six-year-old victim made
one and two days after assault when victim was too afraid to testify at trial);
State ex rel. Harris v. Schmidt, 69 Wis.2d 668, 230 N.W.2d 890 (1975) (five-year-
old stepson of defendant told his mother the next day; told defendant's probation
officer fifteen days later); Love v. State, 64 Wis.2d 432, 219 N.W.2d 294 (1974)
(three-and-a-half-year-old told her mother the next morning after mother noticed
blood); Bertrang v. State, 50 Wis.2d 702, 184 N.W.2d 867 (1971) (nine-year-old
daughter of defendant told her mother the next day); Bridges v. State, 247 Wis.
350, 19 N.W.2d 529, reh'g denied, 247 Wis. 350, 19 N.W.2d 862 (1945) (seven-
year-old told her mother one hour after assault). In all of these cases, the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court allowed the adults' hearsay testimony to be received as sub-
stantive evidence. State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 87 n.3, 337 S.E.2d 833, 841 n.3
(1985).
79. 110 Wis. 2d 414, 329 N.W.2d 263 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
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sent for longer periods of time in young children than in adults.80
The court stressed that "[c]ontemporaneity is not a condition pre-
cedent to a finding of an excited utterance."'" Rather, the court
found that "spontaneity and stress" are the crucial factors.8 2 An-
other jurisdiction which has dealt with this issue is Colorado. The
Colorado Court of Appeals, in People v. Ortega,83 noted that in
cases involving sexually abused young children, the element of
trustworthiness underscoring the excited utterance exception is
primarily found in the "lack of capacity to fabricate rather than
the lack of time to fabricate." ' 4 A federal case which has consid-
ered the issue is United States v. Iron Shell. 5 There the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in extending the excited utterance exception to allow
into evidence a statement of a nine-year-old sexually abused child
to a police officer that was given up to an hour and fifteen minutes
after the assault.8" The court found that "considering the surprise
of the assault, its shocking nature and the age of the declarant," it
was not unreasonable for the trial court to find that the child was
in a state of continuous excitement from the time of the assault.8 7
Additionally, other courts have noted that other factors may cause
a delay between the sexual assault and the child's coming forward
and making a statement. "In allowing a wider length of time,
80. Id. at 421, 329 N.W.2d at 267. See also Annot., Time Element as Affect-
ing Admissibility of Statement of Complaint Made by Victim of Sex Crime as
Res Gestae, Spontaneous Exclamation, or Excited Utterance, 89 A.L.R.3D 102
(1979).
81. 110 Wis. 2d at 420, 329 N.W.2d at 267.
82. Id.
83. 672 P.2d 215, 218 (Colo. App. 1983).
84. Id.
85. 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
86. The officer described the child as being "nervous and scared" and speak-
ing in "short bursts." United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 86 (8th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
87. Id. See also Haggins v. Warden, Ft. Pillow State Farm, 715 F.2d 1050
(6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984) (four-year-old's statement to
nurses and police an hour to an hour and a half after sexual assault). People v.
Stewart, 39 Colo. App. 142, 568 P.2d 65 (1977) (six-year-old victim of sexual as-
sault did not relate her story to her rescuers, but waited to tell the police, (first
authority figures) two hours later; court cited Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2)
and upheld admissibility); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979)
(three-year-old victim of babysitter's sexual assault described event to his mother
when she picked him up from the babysitter's house after the assault; description
properly admitted under Federal Rule 803(24)).
19871
15
Lloyd: Evidence - North Carolina Allows Admission of the Unthinkable: He
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1987
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
courts have indicated that a young child may not make an immedi-
ate complaint because of threats, fear of reprisals, admonishments
of secrecy, or other pressures not to disclose, . . ." particularly
where the child had a close relationship with the offender.88
These courts have recognized the flaws in mechanically apply-
ing the excited utterance exception to situations involving sexually
abused children.89 They have attempted to compensate for the spe-
cial circumstances involving sexually abused children90 by re-
shaping the traditional excited utterance exception. However,
these approaches have been criticized 9' and more comprehensive
approaches have been urged."
Another exception has also been utilized as a means to allow
into evidence hearsay statements made by sexually abused chil-
dren. This exception, the Rule 803(4) medical diagnosis exception,
excepts from the hearsay rule statements made for purposes of
medical diagnosis which describe: (1) medical history; (2) past or
present symptoms, pain, or sensations; or (3) the inception or gen-
eral character of the cause or external source of injury.93 The the-
ory behind allowing these statements into evidence as exceptions
88. Bulkley, supra note 77, at 156. See also State v. Creighton, 462 A.2d 980
(R.I. 1983); People v. Edgar, 113 Mich. App. 528, 317 N.W.2d 675 (1982); and
People v. Bonneau, 323 Mich. 237, 35 N.W.2d 161 (1948).
89. See cases at supra note 87 and Lancaster v. People, 200 Colo. 448, 450,
615 P.2d 720, 723 (1980) (utterance of minor child need not be contemporaneous
with event in order to be admissible as it is unlikely to be premeditated) and
People v. Miller, 58 Ill. App. 3d 156, 161, 373 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 (1978) (court
noted that alleged sexual assault constituted a "sufficiently startling occurrence
and that the child victim spoke spontaneously and without fabrication within
minutes of the event").
90. See cases at supra note 87; Lancaster, 200 Colo. 448, 615 P.2d 720;
Miller, 58 Ill. App. 3d 156, 373 N.E.2d 1077.
91. Yun, supra note 5; Skoler, New Hearsay Exceptions for a Child's State-
ment of Sexual Abuse, 18 J. MAR. 1 (1984), and Bulkley, supra note 77, at 153.
92. Yun, supra note 5 and Skoler, supra note 91, at 40. See supra note 24
and infra notes 195-196 and accompanying text.
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803(4) (1986). At common law in North Car-
olina, statements concerning past, as opposed to present, conditions were not ad-
missible for substantive purposes. See, e.g., Lush v. McDaniel, 35 N.C. (13 Ired.)
485 (1852). Such statements were considered to be untrustworthy. Id. However,
Rule 803(4) clearly extends to statements of past conditions and medical history
made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment. As the Advisory Committee's Note
clearly indicates, the same guarantee of trustworthiness extends to statements of
past conditions and medical history made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803(4) commentary.
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to the hearsay rule is that such statements are inherently trustwor-
thy and reliable because the patient has an interest in clearly and
accurately relaying to medical personnel the cause for the patient's
condition. 4 The Advisory Committee made clear the liberal intent
of Rule 803(4).95 Rule 803(4) extends to statements as to causa-
tion, reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis and treatment, but
statements as to fault would not ordinarily qualify under the ex-
ception. 6 According to the Advisory Committee the statement
need not have been made to a physician:9 7 "Statements to hospital
attendants, ambulance drivers, or even members of the family
might be included."'
Like the excited utterance exception, the exception for state-
ments made for medical diagnosis or treatment has been utilized
as a means of allowing into evidence hearsay statements of sexu-
ally abused children." Commentators have criticized courts for
what has been called "tortured" interpretations of the traditional
hearsay exceptions under Rule 803 to accommodate hearsay state-
ments by child victims.100 The expansive reading of Rule 803(4) as
used in child abuse cases is illustrated by Goldade v. Wyoming."'1
In Goldade a mother was convicted of physically abusing her
daughter solely on the basis of statements made by the child to a
doctor and a nurse. Both the doctor and nurse were allowed to tes-
tify that the child identified the mother as the perpetrator.102 In
affirming the lower court, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held
that in the context of child abuse, 03 Rule 803(4) was properly ap-
plied to allow into evidence hearsay statements identifying the
perpetrator.'0 ' One commentator has noted "[w]hile admissible ev-
idence under traditional doctrine included only the fact that com-
plaint was made, the trend is to allow the details of the offense and
94. 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 444 (1980).
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803(4) commentary (1986).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Skoler, supra note 91, at 7.
loo. Id.
101. 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 725. The Wyoming Supreme Court noted that "the function of the
court must be to pursue the transcendent goal of addressing the most pernicious
social ailment which afflicts our society, family abuse and more specifically, child
abuse." Id.
104. Id. at 728.
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the identity of the offender, a result which appears wholly justifia-
ble."'10 6 However, expanding the coverage of Rule 803(4), like ex-
panding the coverage of the other traditional hearsay exceptions
under Rule 803, has been criticized as not being flexible enough to
allow into evidence crucial hearsay statements made by child vic-
tims of abuse.'0 0
Rule 803(24), titled "Other Exceptions," allows into evidence
statements that are not specifically covered by any of the other
exceptions under Rule 803 if those statements have equivalent cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 0 7 Even under this ex-
ception several requirements must be met before a hearsay state-
ment will be allowed into evidence. The court must determine,
first, whether the statement is offered as evidence of a material
fact; second, whether the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the propo-
nent can procure through reasonable efforts; third, that the general
purpose of the rules of evidence and the interests of justice will
best be served by admission of the statement into evidence; and
finally, whether the proponent has given proper written notice'08 to
the adverse party sufficiently in advance of offering the statement
to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to
meet the statement."0 ' Of all the exceptions listed in Rule 803,
803(24) may be the most significant hearsay exception in terms of
interpretation and application because of its flexible "catchall" na-
105. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 297 (3d ed. 1984). See also VI J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1761 n.2 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976) and cases cited therein.
106. See supra note 91.
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803(24) (1986). Both of North Carolina's
residual provisions, Rule 803(24) and 804(5), are almost identical to their federal
counterparts. See FED. R. EVD 803(24) and 804(5). North Carolina's Rule 804(24)
differs from Federal Rule 803(24) only in that the last sentence of the federal rule
does not require written notice. Rule 803(24) also requires that notice be given
sufficiently in advance of offering the statement while Federal Rule 803(24) re-
quires the notice to be given sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing. Practi-
cally, little if any difference exists between giving notice sufficiently in advance of
offering the statement and sufficient in advance of the trial or hearing. Thus, the
only real difference in the North Carolina Rule 803(24) and the Federal Rule
803(24) is that North Carolina requires written notice. Basically, requiring written
notice merely places an additional administrative duty on North Carolina
attorneys.
108. The written notice must contain a statement by the proponent of his
intent to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant.
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803(24) (1986).
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ture.110 Like the more traditional hearsay exceptions the residual
or catchall exception has been used to admit a child's out-of-court
statements of sexual abuse.' The nature of the catchall exception
itself provides the courts greater flexibility in admitting hearsay
evidence. However, most residual exceptions are still "exceptions
in search of a rule."' 1 2
With the new North Carolina Rules of Evidence effective July
1, 1984 and the continued nightmare of child sexual abuse increas-
ing, it was only a matter of time until a case involving the two
would reach the North Carolina appellate courts. By early spring
1985 such a case, State v. Smith,'" reached the the North Carolina
Supreme Court and gave it the opportunity to determine when,
under the recently adopted Rules of Evidence, North Carolina
would admit into evidence hearsay statements made by a sexually
110. The same "catchall" provision appears at the ends of both Rule 803 and
804. Despite its straightforward language, the provision has been the source of
some controversy within the federal courts. See Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra
note 56, at 78. At common law North Carolina did not provide a catchall excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. Yet the North Carolina courts often admitted hearsay
evidence under the general principle of "res gestae." 1 H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON
NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 158 (2d rev. ed. 1982 & Supp. 1986). "Res gestae"
literally means "things done." Because of the confusion that resulted in using res
gestae to admit hearsay evidence, both courts and commentators advocated not
applying the principle as basis for a hearsay exception. See, e.g., United States v.
Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944) (Res gestae "has been accountable for so
much confusion that it had best be denied any place whatever in legal terminol-
ogy"). Under the new North Carolina Rules of Evidence, res gestae no longer ex-
ists as a basis for a hearsay exception. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803 commen-
tary. While evidence previously admitted under the concept of res gestae may not
fall within a specific hearsay exception or the catchall exception, the res gestae
formula should not be relied on by the courts. Id. The adoption of a catchall
provision over the use of res gestae does not "contemplate an unfettered exercise
of judicial discretion." Id. The legislative history of Federal Rule of Evidence
803(24) reveals that the exception was to be invoked "very rarely, and only in
exceptional circumstances." S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in
1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7051, 7066. See also Lewis, The Residual Ex-
ceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Shuffling the Wild Cards, 15 RUTGERS L.J.
101 (1983); Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule:
Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867 (1982). But see Im-
winkelgried, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions in the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 15 SAN. DIEGO. L. REV. 239 (1978) (urging a more liberal
construction).
111. Skoler, supra note 91, at 7.
112. Sonenshein, supra note 110.
113. 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 83 (1985).
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abused child.
ANALYSIS
Since the effective date of the North Carolina Rules of Evi-
dence was July 1, 1984,114 only a limited number of cases under the
new rules have found their way to the appellate courts. Thus, in-
terpretation of the rules has been limited. While much of the com-
mon law of evidence in North Carolina was grafted into the evi-
dence rules, and while codification of the law did not substantially
change the common law rules, 118 judicial application and interpre-
tation of the new Rules of Evidence are still needed to effectively
implement them.
The Smith case does not attempt to weave prior North Caro-
lina common law principles of evidence into the evidence rules.
Smith does not do so much to change the existing law of evidence,
but begins on a clean slate and gives a fresh interpretation of the
statutory language in the new Rules of Evidence. Smith was the
first real chance a North Carolina appellate court had to address
issues concerning interpretation of three of the statutory hearsay
rules. The significance of the decision is the detailed analysis and
interpretation it provides of the new Rules of Evidence, rather
than the alteration of the common law principles existing prior to
codification.
In Smith the North Carolina Supreme Court liberally inter-
preted hearsay exceptions Rule 803(2), excited utterance, and Rule
803(4), statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment,
and provided a detailed interpretation of the Rule 803(24), catchall
exception. The court held the excited utterance exception covered
statements made by the child victims, although several days had
passed since the actual sexual assault occurred. 6 The court also
found the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diag-
nosis covered statements made by the child victims to persons who
are not medical personnel as long as the statements are for the
purpose of obtaining treatment.'"7 Finally, the court provided trial
judges a framework to apply when deciding whether a statement is
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 commentary (1986).
115. 1 H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 2, at 2 n.6
(Supp. 1986).
116. 315 N.C. at 90, 337 S.E.2d at 843.
117. Id. at 85, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
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admissible under the Rule 803(24) catchall exception.118
The court began its evaluation of the hearsay evidence by con-
sidering Rule 803(2), the excited utterance exception. In conclud-
ing that the children's statements to their grandmother some three
days after the assault were properly admitted under this exception
the court reasoned that "spontaneity and stress" are the crucial
factors when determining admissibility under 803(2), and not
"contemporaneity."11 9 To come within Rule 803(2) there must be:
(1) a sufficiently startling experience suspending reflective thought,
and (2) a spontaneous reaction, not one resulting from reflection or
fabrication. 20 The court noted that these two requirements neces-
sitate subjective standards and although the requirement of spon-
taneity is often measured in terms of the lapse of time between the
startling event and the statement, the trend now is to consider
whether the delay in making the statement gave the declarant an
opportunity to manufacture or fabricate the statement.1 21
The court recognized "that a broad and a liberal interpreta-
tion is to be given to what constitutes an "excited utterance" when
applied to young children." 2 The court noted that stress and
spontaneity often linger for longer periods of time in young chil-
dren than in adults.1 23 The court pointed out that: (1) a child is
apt to repress the incident, (2) often a child is unlikely to report
this kind of incident to anyone but the mother or some other pa-
rental figure, and (3) the characteristics of young children work to
produce declarations free of conscious fabrication for a longer pe-
riod after the incident than with adults.' 24 The court found other
reasons for allowing a greater length of time for child excited utter-
ances. The court indicated that a young child may not make imme-
diate complaint because of pressures not to disclose, particularly
where, as here, the child had a close relationship with the
offender. 2 5
Although the evidence in this case indicated that the assault
118. Id. at 92-98, 337 S.E.2d at 844-848.
119. Id. at 88, 337 S.E.2d at 842.
120. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 297 (3d ed. 1984).
121. 315 N.C. at 86-87, 337 S.E.2d at 841.
122. Id. at 87, 337 S.E.2d at 841.
i23. Annot., Time Element as Affecting Admissibility of Statement of Com-
plaint Made by Victim of Sex Crime as Res Gestae, Spontaneous Exclamation,
or Excited Utterance, 89 A.L.R.3D 102 (1979).
124. 315 N.C. at 88, 337 S.E.2d at 841.
125. Id. at 89, 337 S.E.2d at 842.
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took place some two to three days before the statements were
made, the court found the statements met the requirements of
spontaneity and stress. The grandmother testified that the chil-
dren were "afraid," and "scared" when relating the incident.12 In
revealing the information to her grandmother, Gloria said, "I have
something to tell you . . . I want you to come in the room. I am
scared. . .I want to tell you what Sylvester done [sic] to me." The
court found that under these circumstances the grandmother's tes-
timony concerning what the girls had told her was admissible as an
excited utterance. 127
The court next evaluated the hearsay statements made by
Gloria and Janell in light of the Rule 803(4) medical diagnosis ex-
ception. In concluding that the children's statements to their
grandmother, but not to the two Rape Task Force volunteers, were
admissible under Rule 803(4), the court held that statements by
child victims to persons who are not medical personnel are still
admissible so long as the statements are for the purpose of ob-
taining treatment. 128 The court also held that it was proper to al-
low into evidence, under 803(4), those portions of the hearsay testi-
mony identifying the defendant as the perpetrator. 29
The defendant argued that the children's statements were not
admissible under the Rule 803(4) hearsay exception because none
of the witnesses held licenses to practice medicine or psychology
and therefore could not provide medical diagnosis or treatment.
The court declined to follow defendant's argument and instead fol-
lowed the commentary to Rule 803(4).130 The commentary to the
rule explains that "[ujnder the exception the statement need not
have been made to a physician. Statements to hospital attendants,
ambulance drivers, or even members of the family might be in-
cluded." The court noted that the reasoning behind the Rule
803(4) exception was the inherent trustworthiness of a statement
made by a patient seeking medical attention.'' While the children
did not specifically request medical attention, the court recognized
"that young children cannot independently seek out medical atten-
tion, but must rely on their caretakers to do so."'32 The children's
126. Id. at 88, 337 S.E.2d at 842.
127. Id. at 90, 337 S.E.2d at 843.
128. Id. at 84-85, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
129. Id. at 85, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
130. Id. at 84, 337 S.E.2d at 839.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 84, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
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hearsay statements to their grandmother resulted in their getting
medical attention. The court therefore concluded that the grand-
mother's testimony as to the statements was admissible." 3 How-
ever, the court found the hearsay testimony of the Rape Task
Force volunteers inadmissible because statements made to them by
the children were made after the children had already reached the
hospital and received medical treatment.""
The defendant also argued that it was improper to admit into
evidence under Rule 803(4) portions of hearsay evidence identify-
ing him as the perpetrator. The court alluded to the point that
some courts have found the identity of the perpetrator irrelevant
under the Rule 803(4) medical diagnosis exception. The court rec-
ognized that the inherent reliability of the statement could be di-
minished if the declarant is under the impression that he is being
asked the identity of the perpetrator. 3 However, the court stated
that the trustworthiness remains intact if the motivation for the
statement was to disclose information to aid in medical diagnosis
or treatment.' The court pointed out that "evidence under the
traditional doctrine included only the fact that complaint was
made, the trend [now] is to allow the details of the offenses and
the identity of the offender."' 1 7 The court concluded that Mrs. Da-
vis was properly allowed to testify that Gloria identified Sylvester
as her assailant. 3 '
After holding that the testimony of the two Rape Task Force
volunteers was inadmissible under the Rule 803(4) medical diagno-
sis exception, the court proceeded to determine whether the testi-
mony was admissible under the Rule 803(24) catchall exception. In
holding that the testimony did not meet the admissibility require-
ments of Rule 803(24), the court laid a framework for trial judges
to apply when determining whether a hearsay statement is admis-
sible under Rule 803(24).139 The trial judge in Smith did not spec-
ify the reason for his refusal to limit the testimony to corrobora-
tion. If he allowed the testimony of Ms. Gladden and Ms. Peterson
in evidence under 803(24), he did not indicate this in the record.
Therefore, no findings or any other support indicated that the trial
133. Id. at 85, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
134. Id. at 86, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
135. Id. at 85, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 90-98, 337 S.E.2d at 843-48.
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judge analyzed the admissibility of the hearsay statements under
the requirements set out in Rule 803(24). The supreme court indi-
cated that the Rule 803(24) catchall exception was not meant to
give unbridled judicial discretion on questions of admissibility
where the hearsay is not covered by another exception, but that
the exception was to be "carefully scrutinized by the trial judge
within the framework of the rule's requirements.' ' 4 0
The court laid out the six-part inquiry required of trial judges
to determine the admissibility of hearsay under Rule 803(24). The
first inquiry the trial judge must make is whether proper notice
has been given. This preliminary requirement must be satified
before the court can even consider the hearsay statement. Notice
must be: (1) in writing; (2) provided to the adverse party suffi-
ciently in advance of offering it to allow him to prepare to meet it;
(3) contain a statement of the proponent's intention to offer the
hearsay testimony, the particulars of the hearsay testimony, and
the name and address of the declarant."' The trial judge must
make this initial determination as to whether proper notice was
given and must include that determination in the record.14 2
Once the trial judge determines that the proper notice has
been given, he must determine whether the statement is not specif-
ically covered by any of the other twenty-three exceptions listed in
Rule 803. If the judge determines that the hearsay falls into one of
the other exceptions, Rule 803(24) does not apply. Smith requires
that whatever the determination, the trial judge must enter his
conclusion in the record, but detailed findings of fact as to whether
other exceptions apply are not required. " '
The third requirement is that the statement be trustworthy. If
the hearsay statement does not fit into one of the twenty-three
other exceptions it may still possess "circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness" equal to that required by the other exceptions. 4
The court noted the struggle with the meaning of the require-
ment.'"5 Among the factors the court listed to consider when deter-
mining "trustworthiness" are: (1) assurance of personal knowledge
of the declarant of the underlying event; 46 (2) the declarant's mo-
140. Id. at 92, 337 S.E.2d at 844.
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803(24) (1986).
142. 315 N.C. at 92, 337 S.E.2d at 844.
143. Id. at 93, 337 S.E.2d at 844.
144. Id. at 93, 337 S.E.2d at 844-45.
145. Id. at 93, 337 S.E.2d at 845.
146. Id. at 93-94, 337 S.E.2d at 845 (citing United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d
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tivation to speak the truth or otherwise;'"" (3) whether the declar-
ant ever recanted the testimony;'4 8 and (4) the practical availabil-
ity of the declarant at trial for meaningful cross-examination.' 4 9
However, the court pointed out that "[nlone of these factors, alone
or in combination, may conclusively establish or discount the
statement's 'circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,'" and
that the judge should "focus upon the factors that bear on the de-
clarant at the time of making the out-of-court statement and
should keep in mind that the peculiar factual context within which
the statement was made will determine its trustworthiness.' ' 10 The
court further stated that the trial judge, in making his determina-
tion as to trustworthiness, must include both his conclusion and
reasoning in the record. The determination of trustworthiness ap-
pears to require much more of judges than is required under the
other portions of Rule 803(24). "Findings of fact and conclusions
of law as to the trustworthiness requirement must appear in the
record.' 6
The fourth requirement is that the statement be material.
This requirement of materiality is the same as the requirement of
relevancy set out in Rules 401 and 402. Although a statement is
not covered by any of the other enumerated exceptions and has
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, the trial judge may
not admit the evidence unless he determines that it is offered as
evidence of a material fact. Findings of fact as to materiality need
not be made, but the trial judge must state in the record that the
evidence was offered as evidence of a material fact, if he so con-
cludes. Likewise, if the trial judge concludes that the evidence of-
fered is not material, he should enter this conclusion in the record
954, 962 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983) and United States v.
Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir. 1975) (applying Federal Rule 804(b)(5)),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977)).
147. Id. at 93, 337 S.E.2d at 845, (citing Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d
286, 292 (7th Cir. 1979)).
148. Id. (citing United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 962 (6th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983)).
149. Id. at 94, 337 S.E.2d at 845 (citing M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 803.24 (1981); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1350 (7th
Cir. 1978) (dictum), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); and 4 D. LoUISELL & C.
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 472 (1980) ("the 'trustworthiness' of statements
offered under Rule 803(24) is slightly less a matter of concern where the declarant
in fact testifies and is subject to cross-examination")).
150. Smith, 315 N.C. at 94, 337 S.E.2d at 845.
151. Id. (emphasis added).
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and the inquiry should end.162
The fifth requirement under Rule 803(24) is that the hearsay
statement must be "more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts." 1 3 The court termed this requirement
"necessity. 1'6 4 This "necessity" requirement imposes the obligation
of a dual inquiry. First, were the proponent's efforts to procure
more probative evidence diligent? Second, is the statement more
probative on the point than other evidence that the proponent
could reasonably procure?1 55
The court noted that the degree of necessity is decreased when
the declarant is available at trial. Testimony by the declarant is
usually, but not always, 66 the most probative evidence on point.
The problem with Rule 803(24), as the court pointed out, is that it
allows hearsay evidence to be admitted "even though the declarant
is available as a witness."' Because the declarant may be availa-
ble to testify and this is usually the most probative evidence on
point, the court strongly suggested that the trial judge "take care
in documenting for the record his basis for finding that this 'neces-
sity' requirement is met.'"1 6  The record must reflect findings
of fact and conclusions of law supporting the trial judge's
determination.1 59
Under the last of the six requirements the trial court must de-
termine whether "the general purposes of [the] rules [of evidence]
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence."' 60 The court referred to Rule 102 which
states that, "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the
end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly de-
termined." Once the trial judge considers whether admission of the
hearsay would best serve the purposes of justice, the court requires
152. Id. at 94-95, 337 S.E.2d at 845.
153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803(24) (1986).
154. 315 N.C. at 96, 337 S.E.2d at 846.
155. Id. at 95, 337 S.E.2d at 846.
156. As in this case, the testimony of a child witness is not necessarily the
most probative evidence.
157. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803(24) (1986).
158. 315 N.C. at 96, 337 S.E.2d at 846.
159. Id.
160. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803(24) (1986).
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the judge to state his conclusion, and while detailed findings of fact
are not required, the trial judge must include his analysis in the
record.""
In summary, the court restated the importance of trial judges
following this framework when analyzing whether hearsay state-
ments are admissible under Rule 803(24). For the trial judge's own
benefit, such a detailed analysis requires the judge to give careful
consideration to the hearsay before allowing it into evidence under
Rule 803(24). Detailed analysis is also necessary for meaningful ap-
pellate review. However, the court chose only to apply its holding
concerning the six-part inquiry under Rule 803(24) to trials of
cases which began after the certification date of the Smith
opinion."'
Concerning the hearsay testimony of the two Rape Task Force
volunteers the court determined that it was reversible error to al-
low into evidence testimony by Ms. Glidden to the effect that Glo-
ria told her that Sylvester "put his finger in her 'butt.'"163 This
evidence was in direct conflict with Gloria's testimony at trial. At
trial Gloria testified the only place Sylvester touched her was her
vagina. Although Mrs. Davis, the grandmother, later testified that
Gloria had told her that Sylvester had placed his hand in her
"butt," the court found Ms. Glidden's testimony to be highly prej-
udicial, requiring reversal of defendant's conviction for first degree
sexual offense as to Gloria, and remanding that charge for a new
trial.'"
In deciding Smith, the North Carolina Supreme Court at-
tempted to provide protection for children who suffer from sexual
abuse. The principles announced in the decision will potentially
lead to the conviction of those responsible for sexually abusing
children. The liberal interpretation of the excited utterance and
medical diagnosis exceptions will allow into evidence hearsay
which technically could be excluded under strict interpretation of
the exceptions. Admissions of such hearsay increases the chances
of criminal conviction by helping to build a case against the de-
fendant. Bringing a defendant to trial can, in turn, lead to a num-
ber of sanctions: the defendant may be found guilty and impris-
oned thus removing the defendant from the child, or the defendant
161. 315 N.C. at 96, 337 S.E.2d at 847.
162. Id. at 98, 337 S.E.2d at 847.
163. Id. at 99, 337 S.E.2d at 848.
164. Id.
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may be committed and receive mental health treatment. Even if
the defendant is not convicted, the outcome may still be beneficial:
the defendant may seek mental health treatment on his or her own
initiative, the child may be removed from the defendant on a
showing of neglect or abuse,s or a family member may be made
aware of the hazards to the child and make special efforts to pro-
tect the child. By allowing into evidence hearsay statements made
by sexually abused children, more of the people responsible for
sexual child abuse can be brought to trial and convicted. The ulti-
mate result of successful prosecutions is that more children will be
protected.
In addressing the specific effects Smith has upon the interpre-
tation of the hearsay exceptions in the context of child sexual
abuse, the case first provides expansive coverage for the Rule
803(2) excited utterance exception. The coverage reaches state-
ments made by child victims although several days may have
passed since the actual sexual assault.166 By making "stress and
spontaneity" the crucial factors determining admissibility under
Rule 803(2),167 the case gives flexibility in determining what is an
"excited utterance." No longer is the time lapse between the event
and the statement determinative.1" By following the trend and
considering whether the delay in making the statement gave the
declarant an opportunity to manufacture or fabricate the state-
ment,169 Smith will allow into evidence a greater number of hear-
say statements removed from the event which caused the excite-
ment. This approach is especially meaningful in the context of
child sexual abuse cases because "stress and spontaneity" are often
present for longer periods of time in young children than in
adults,17 0 and the characteristics of young children work to produce
declarations free of conscious fabrication for a longer period after
165. Reference here is made to social services' ability to remove the child
from the defendant upon establishing that the child was abused or neglected.
This includes "protective services" as defined under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-542
(1986), "secure and non-secure custody" under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-574 (1986),
and "termination of parental rights" under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.23 (1986).
166. 315 N.C. at 90, 337 S.E.2d at 843.
167. Id. at 88, 337 S.E.2d at 842.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 86-87, 337 S.E.2d at 841.
170. Annot., Time Element as Affecting Admissibility of Statement of Com-
plaint Made by Victim of Sex Crime as Res Gestae, Spontaneous Exclamation,
or Excited Utterance, 89 A.L.R.3D 102 (1979).
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the incident than with adults."1 By recognizing the special charac-
teristics of children, Smith allows added leniency in cases where
the declarant is a child.
The case can also be interpreted to allow leniency in cases
where the declarant is an adult. Because the court held that stress
and spontaneity are the crucial factors that the trial court should
consider in determining admissibility under Rule 803(2), even
adult hearsay that would traditionally be inadmissible, now may be
admissible. Although stress and spontaneity may not be present
for as long a period in adults as it is in children, certainly stress
and spontaneity can extend the time frame in which adults may
make an "excited utterance." For example, an adult victim may
suppress an incident and only relay what happened when given an
opportunity to seek help. Such a scenario may exist in a situation
where a rape victim knows the assailant or when a battered wife is
afraid to admit that her husband is abusing her. The time lapse
between the actual assault and the statement can be significant. If
only the time lapse is considered, the hearsay may be inadmissible.
However, if the focus is on stress and spontaneity the hearsay may
be admissible.
Second, Smith gives a liberal interpretation of the Rule 803(4)
medical diagnosis exception. The coverage of this exception
reaches statements made by sexually abused victims to persons
who are not medical personnel as long as the statements are for the
purpose of obtaining treatment.172 These statements are admissible
even when they identify the perpetrator."' In following the com-
mentary to the rule,1 4 Smith emphasizes that the main concern is
that the statement be made for the purpose of obtaining medical
treatment. The statement need not be made to medical personnel
to be admissible.
Smith's interpretation of Rule 803(4) is significant for a child
declarant. The effect is that numerous hearsay statements may be
admissible after the fact as long as the statements were intended
to lead to medical diagnosis or treatment. Because most children
cannot independently seek out medical attention and must rely on
their caretakers 7 " to do so, some form of hearsay will usually be
171. 315 N.C. at 88, 337 S.E.2d at 841.
172. Id. at 85, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
173. Id.
174. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 803 commentary (1986).
175. See infra note 186.
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admissible when that child relates the experience to his or her
caretaker and medical attention is sought as a result of the
conversation.
Furthermore, Smith allows into evidence those portions of a
child's hearsay statements which identify the perpetrator. 7 The
only limitation to this exception is that the identification must be
a part of statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or
treatment. This approach breaks with the traditional doctrine.
Under the traditional view only the fact that the complaint was
made was admissible. Smith, however, follows the modern trend
which allows into evidence both the details of the offense and the
identity of the offender. 177 This approach is significant in child sex-
ual abuse cases where the only identification the state may have is
an out-of-court statement made by a child victim whose testimony
is questionable. Allowing into evidence hearsay statements identi-
fying the defendant as the person responsible for the act can bol-
ster the state's case and increase the chances of a conviction.
Finally, Smith gives a detailed framework within which trial
judges may apply the Rule 803(24) catchall exception. 78 At com-
mon law, North Carolina did not provide a catchall exception to
the hearsay rule. Hearsay evidence was admitted under the general
principle of res gestae. 179 Smith is the first case to interpret in de-
tail Rule 803(24).11o The case plainly sets forth the process a trial
judge must go through to determine whether a hearsay statement
is admissible under Rule 803(24), what findings of fact must be
made, what reasons must be specified, and what conclusions must
be stated. The effect of Smith is that all trial judges should know
exactly what is expected and required of them when ruling on ad-
missibility under Rule 803(24). Therefore, the likelihood of judicial
misinterpretation of the admissibility requirements of Rule 803(24)
are minimized. No trial judge should fail because of lack of under-
standing to determine admissibility of evidence under Rule 803(24)
in accord with the rule's full requirements.
While Smith does give liberal interpretation concerning the
admissibility of certain hearsay statements, the case does not give
176. 315 N.C. at 85, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
177. Id.
178. See supra notes 139-164 and accompanying text.
179. 1 H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 158 (2d rev. ed.
1982 & Supp. 1986).
180. See also State v. Tripplett, 316 N.C. 1, 340 S.E.2d 736 (1986) (giving a
detailed interpretation of Rule 804(b)(5)).
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carte blanche for the admission of any and all hearsay statements
made by sexually abused children. Smith does not threaten a de-
fendant's constitutional right to a fair trial or to confront witnesses
against him or her. 181 The hearsay exceptions still require that cer-
tain guarantees of trustworthiness be present before a hearsay
statement will be allowed into evidence. The excited utterance ex-
ception still requires: "(1) a sufficiently startling experience sus-
pending reflective thought and (2) a spontaneous reaction, not one
resulting from reflection or fabrication. 182 The Rule 803(4) hear-
say exception for medical diagnosis requires that the statements
must have been made for the purpose of obtaining medical
treatment. 8
Furthermore, Smith's detailed analysis of the Rule 803(24)
catchall exception, certainly does not give child hearsay in sexual
abuse cases a free ticket into court. The stringent requirements of
admissibility under Rule 803(24) will prevent otherwise trustwor-
thy testimony from being received into evidence. Specific notice
requirements must be met. The stumbling block for admissibility
under Rule 803(24) is the condition that the statement be more
probative on the issue than any other evidence which the propo-
nent can procure through reasonable efforts. Usually testimony by
the declarant has the most probative value. If a child victim testi-
fies, the testimony may be considered the most probative and ex-
clude testimony by others concerning hearsay statements of the
child declarant. Meeting all six requirements of Rule 803(24) as
defined in Smith will not be easy. The requirements are strict, and
although Rule 803(24) is the catchall exception, judges are cau-
tioned about the frequency of the rule's use. In fact, Smith's inter-
pretation of Rule 803(24) will make it harder to introduce into evi-
dence child hearsay statements inadmissible under any of the
other Rule 803 exceptions. Not only must the six legal criteria of
the rule be met, but judges may not want to be burdened with the
administrative tasks under the rule, particularly making the de-
tailed findings of fact and specific conclusions of law.
The court in Smith did not avoid any issues, but the case
raises questions of how the holding will be applied to cases involv-
ing hearsay statements made by adults. Smith's interpretation of
the excited utterance exception was specifically tailored to situa-
181. See supra note 16.
182. 315 N.C. at 86, 337 S.E.2d at 841.
183. Id. at 84, 337 S.E.2d at 839.
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tions involving child declarants. The court specifically noted how
spontaneity and stress are "often present for a longer period of
time in young children than in adults.' 1 84 While this is true, spon-
taneity and stress are still the critical factors that may be applied
to a situation involving an adult; the only difference being that a
child declarant will usually be allowed a greater lapse of time be-
tween the event and the statement. The standard for determining
what is, or is not, an "excited utterance" is subjective. 8 ' Thus, in
any case, whether it involves an adult or a child declarant, admissi-
bility will vary.
Smith's interpretation of Rule 803(4), the medical diagnosis
exception is likewise applicable to adults, as well as children. The
idea that the statement made for purposes of medical treatment
can be made to anyone is not limited to a child declarant. The
only significant advantage a child might have is his or her depen-
dency upon a caretaker. 86 This dependency might prompt hearsay
statements, thus making such statements more abundant. State-
ments from an adult may be limited because of an adult's ability to
seek medical treatment many times without assistance. The idea
that hearsay statements identifying the perpetrator can be admis-
sible under Rule 803(4) is also applicable to adults, as long as the
statement was made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treat-
ment. This holding can have important ramifications, especially in
a rape case and even civil litigation involving personal injury, by
making it easier to prove the identity of either the assailant or the
negligent party.
Likewise, Smith's interpretation of the statutory requirements
of the catchall or residual exception applies across the board, not
just to child abuse cases. Any time a proponent seeks to offer into
evidence a hearsay statement under the Rule 803(24) exception, all
six requirements of the rule must be met. The court in Smith did
more than simply track statutory language of the language of Rule
803(24). The court went further and imposed upon the trial courts
administrative duties that were not imposed on them before
Smith. Smith's strict guidelines which set out the trial courts' new
administrative duties are helpful and necessary. First, they prompt
184. Id. at 87, 337 S.E.2d at 841.
185. Id. at 86-87, 337 S.E.2d at 841.
186. The court in Smith did not define caretaker. However, one could assume
that a caretaker would be anyone responsible for or having custody of a child such
as a parent, babysitter, teacher, daycare operation, a grandparent or other
relative.
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the judge to really ponder whether or not the evidence should be
admitted under the residual exception. By going through the pro-
cess step by step the judge may think twice before admitting any
evidence he thinks is margainally trustworthy simply because of
Rule 803(24)'s catchall nature. Second, the guidelines described in
Smith are necessary for effective appellate review when admission
of the hearsay statement is challenged after the trial. A reviewing
court cannot possibly make an informed decision concerning the
admissibility of the evidence if the trial judge does not properly
document his ruling. Finally, because of the very nature of a child
sexual abuse case, a judge may take extra care to meet the Rule
803(24) requirements so that certain hearsay will be allowed in evi-
dence to help convict the person responsible for the abuse.
Although deciding the admissibility of evidence under Rule
803(24) requires some time and careful consideration, the fre-
quency that trial judges would be required to decide on Rule
803(24) admissibility is not that great because hearsay usually falls
into one of the numerated exceptions. In situations where the
judge is required to make such a determination, very few hearsay
statements could withstand the rigors of the Smith analysis. The
analysis has six steps: if even one reflects a deficiency, the analysis
ends and the evidence is inadmissible.
In Smith, the North Carolina Supreme Court expanded tradi-
tional hearsay exceptions to allow into evidence hearsay state-
ments made by sexually abused children. This approach of ex-
panding the traditional hearsay exceptions has been used in other
jurisdictions. ' This expansion facilitates the goal of protecting
children from sexual abuse by maximizing the amount of hearsay
that may be used to successfully prosecute assailants. Smith's ap-
proach facilitates the ultimate goal of protecting children from sex-
ual abuse and mistreatment. While other methods may grant more
protection,188 the North Carolina Supreme Court provided the
maximum amount of protection possible under the present rules of
evidence. The solution in Smith is a the correct result under the
187. See, e.g., United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980) (ap-
peals court held that trial court did not abuse its discretion in stretching the ex-
cited utterance exception to the hearsay rule to allow in statement of a nine-year-
old female victim of sexual abuse to a police officer); Jackson v. State, 31 Md.
App. 332, 356 A.2d 299 (1976) (in trial for sexual assault on a five-year-old, testi-
mony of mother that shortly after the event, the child told her details of the as-
sault, was admissible under excited utterance exception to hearsay rule).
188. See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
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law of North Carolina.
Smith's expansion of the traditional hearsay exceptions has
been criticized.'89 This expansion has been characterized as inade-
quate because it fails to allow into evidence certain hearsay state-
ments that should be admissible. 190 Critics also claim that this ex-
pansion distorts these traditional exceptions.' 91 However, the court
is not a mini-legislature and, while Smith's approach may be inad-
equate to insure admissibility, the decision does provide a greater
degree of flexibility in allowing the introduction of hearsay state-
ments by a child declarant. Courts should give special considera-
tion and treatment to child declarants in sexual abuse cases. Appli-
cation and interpretation of Smith will not lead to distortions of
the traditional hearsay rules. Special considerations can also be
given to child declarants and their hearsay statements without
wreaking havoc with the statutory rules as applied to an adult
declarant.
Admission of child hearsay statements under the residual ex-
ception 192 has received more favorable reviews. 193 The residual ex-
ception has been noted as being more responsive .to the need to
admit such evidence.194 The admission of child hearsay statements
under the residual or catchall exception may be the only way to get
into evidence a hearsay statement that clearly will not fall into an-
other exception. If, under Smith, the statement meets the six-part
test, the statement is admissible. While the test is difficult to meet,
the potential for admission exists, and Smith's interpretation of
Rule 803(24) spells out exactly the requirements.
The North Carolina Supreme Court should be commended for
its judicial initiative in broadly interpreting two hearsay exceptions
and providing guidance for a third in a manner which affords pro-
tection to children who suffer from sexual abuse. The other ap-
proaches suggested to insure admission of child hearsay involve
legislative intervention. One legislative approach is simply to cre-
ate a new hearsay exception for a child's statements concerning
sexual abuse. 95 The second approach involves using videotaped in-
189. Yun, supra note 5 and Skoler, supra note 91.
190. Yun, supra note 5, at 1753-63; Skoler, supra note 91, at 7-8.
191. Yun, supra note 5, at 1759; Skoler, supra note 91, at 7-8.
192. Both Rules 803(24) and 804(5) have been used to admit hearsay state-
ments of sexually abused children.
193. Yun, supra note 5, at 1761.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1987), and KAN.
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terviews and depositions which insulate the child from the trauma
of being in open court at the trial.'96 The taped proceeding allows
cross-examination of the child witness, but not direct confronta-
tion. Since the court in Smith had only the Rule 803 hearsay ex-
ceptions within which to work, the court did the best it could to
provide protection to sexually abused children by allowing into evi-
dence hearsay statements that could potentially lead to the convic-
tion of those responsible for such abuse.
CONCLUSION
The holdings and logic of Smith will aid in the conviction of
those guilty of child molestation by expanding the hearsay excep-
tions for excited utterances and medical diagnosis, and by provid-
ing guidance for when the Rule 803(24) catchall exception applies.
Smith accommodates situations involving child declarants and
maximizes under Rule 803(2) and (4), the use of potentially dam-
aging hearsay evidence needed to convict the assailants responsible
for the abuse. Smith's analysis of the Rule 803(24) catchall excep-
tion now makes clear and definite what is required of trial judges
when they are faced with deciding admissibility of a hearsay state-
ment under Rule 803(24).Admittedly, Smith does not insure admissibility of all critical
hearsay statements made by child victims of sexual abuse. Legisla-
tive intervention in North Carolina is needed if a dramatic change
is to be made in the treatment of hearsay by a sexually abused
child. While legislative intervention is desirable, courts must deal
with the present legislation. By working within the confines of the
North Carolina Rules of Evidence, Smith's approach of expanding
the traditional hearsay exceptions under Rule 803 provides greater
flexibility in allowing introduction of hearsay evidence of a child
declarant. The approach in Smith cannot be criticized merely be-
cause it seeks to expand traditional hearsay exceptions.
The most significant practical implication of Smith will be the
decision's strict guidelines that trial judges must follow when rul-
ing on admissibility under Rule 803(24). The trial judges must doc-
ument their reasoning in detail. While this may place an increased
administrative burden on trial judges, this detail is necessary to
STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (Supp. 1986). See also supra note 24.
196. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.90 (West Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §
46-15-401 (1985); N.M. CHILDREN'S CT. R. 10-217 (1986) (implementing N.M. STAT,
ANN. § 30-9-18 (1984)). See also supra note 24.
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insure that trial judges actually make the analysis and document
their rulings for effective appellate review.
Smith raises the question of how the holdings in the case will
be applied to cases involving hearsay statements made by adults.
The reasoning of the decision is sound and the language clear.
Smith sets out the circumstances and characteristics of a child de-
clarant that warrant special attention and consideration. The hold-
ings in Smith are equally applicable to adult declarants, but child
declarants will receive more leniency in determining admissibility
of hearsay.
Smith goes far in giving child victims of sexual assaults the
protection they need and deserve. While the decision does not pro-
vide the protection that legislative intervention could provide, the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Smith should be commended for
its judicial initiative in broadly interpreting two hearsay exceptions
and providing guidance on a third. The holding in Smith will help
to protect children who suffer the fate of sexual abuse and help
end the nightmare that is real.
Benita A. Lloyd
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